عنوان مقاله [English]
In his book, The God Who Risks, John Sanders tries to reach an adequate resolution to the conflict between divine foreknowledge and human free will. He admits God’s omniscience but denies His exhaustive definite foreknowledge of future events. Sanders calls this “dynamic omniscience”. According to this view, future events are not knowable and are epistemologically open; So, divine foreknowledge is not logically possible. God knows all there is to know, but omniscience does not require foreknowledge. God may give a forecast of what he thinks will occur based on his exhaustive knowledge of past and present factors, but such predictions are always open to the possibility that God might be mistaken about some points. Just as omnipotence is not denied by saying that God cannot do the logically impossible, so too omniscience is not denied by saying that God cannot foreknow the logically unknowable. This article is an exposition and critical evaluation of Sanders’s view.
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