عنوان مقاله [English]
Craig believes that theological fatalistic argument, which aims at mocking human freedom, faces two major problems. On the one hand, in the argument, there is a confusion of necessitas consequentis and necessitas consequentiae in the concept of “within one’s power”. On the other hand, the argument neglects the difference between “changing the past” and “counterfactual effect. Besides critically assessing theological fatalism, Craig suggests a proof for human freedom which can be categorized as a Molinistic argument in virtue of appealing to the notion of middle knowledge. According to Craig, we do not need to make philosophical argument for the middle knowledge. Nevertheless, there are many theological argument in support of the idea. For instance, divine providence and foreknowledge are two theological concepts which can be best explained by appealing to the notion of middle knowledge. It seems, however, that Craig’s appeal to the notion of middle knowledge for proving human freedom faces some problems. Alongside the critiques provided by Thomists regarding the middle knowledge (e.g. the lack of object for this kind of knowledge and passivity of divine knowledge), it seems that Craig’s notion of human freedom is not compatible with middle knowledge.
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