عنوان مقاله [English]
This paper considers the Allāma Ṭabāṭabāī’s Ṣiddīqin argument from a new point of view. First, his particular philosophical foundations of the argument are clearly expressed and after that, four different versions of the Ṣiddīqin argument are presented. In one version, we have concerned with the explanation of the argument on the basis of the broad sense of reality, while in another version, we have presented the argument as a sound one which is based on denial of metaphysical distinction between quiddity and existence in reality as well as the notions of absolute and conditioned reality in Ṭabāṭabāī’s view. Furthermore, we have examined other versions of this argument. As a result of this inquiry, those versions which are based on the broad sense of reality and particularly on denial of metaphysical distinction between quiddity and existence in reality, because of focusing on particular philosophical foundations of Allāma Ṭabāṭabāī, are sound and successful, while other versions are insufficient both in interpreting Allāma Ṭabāṭabāī’s view or in representing an argument for the existence of God.