تحلیل و نقد شرطیه پاسکال با توجه به نظریه تصمیم سازی

نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار گروه فلسفه و کلام دانشگاه امام صادق (ع)، تهران، ایران

2 کارشناس ارشد فلسفه و کلام دانشگاه امام صادق(ع)، تهران، ایران

چکیده

یکی از استدلال‌های ارائهشده در زمینة اثبات وجود خدا و معقولیت باورهای دینی، استدلالی است که به «شرطیة پاسکال» یا «شرط‌بندی پاسکال» مشهور است. این استدلال که از مناقشه‌انگیزترین استدلال‌های اثبات وجود خدا و معقولیت باورهای دینی در مباحث فلسفة دین است، بیان می‌دارد در جایی که دلایل و استدلال‌های عقلی و نظریِ اثبات وجود خدا کفایت نکنند، باز هم باور به وجود خدا و دیگر باورهای دینی از جمله باور به زندگی پس از مرگ، و زندگی بر اساس این باورها، تنها گزینة معقول و محتاطانة پیش روست و دوراندیشی، احتیاط و مصلحت‌اندیشی اقتضا می‌کند که در مقام عمل و تصمیم‌سازی، وجود خدا و حقانیت آموزه‌های دینی را مورد اذعان و اقرار قرار دهیم و بر حقانیت آن‌ها شرط‌بندی کنیم. این استدلال با قرار گرفتن در چارچوب نظریة تصمیم‌سازی و با توجه به مباحث «حساب احتمالات» و «سودِ موردِ انتظار» (سود محتمَل) و محاسبۀ ریسک، پرورش و پیرایش یافته و منجر به ارائة چهار تقریر جدید از آن شده است که عبارت‌اند از «استدلال برتری»، «استدلال سود مورد انتظار»، «استدلال سود مورد انتظار برتر» و «استدلال برتری قاطع».

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Analysis of Pascal’s Wager with Emphasis on the Decision-Making Theory

نویسندگان [English]

  • Reza Akbari 1
  • Abbas Khosravi Farsani 2
1 Assistant Professor at Department of Philosophy and Kalam at Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran
2 MA in Philosophy and Kalam at Imam Sadiq University, Tehran. Iran
چکیده [English]

One of the arguments for proving God’s existence and the intelligibility of religious beliefs is that which is known as Pascal’s Wager. According to this highly disputable argument, in the absence of sufficient theoretical and rational evidence for proving God’s existence, the only intelligible and cautious option is belief in God, the afterlife, and shaping our lives thereon. A prudent and expedient mind necessitates the consideration of God and the justification of religious beliefs when it comes to decision-making and practice.
This argument is polished by the decision-making theory and by considering discourses on “rules of probability”, “expected utility” and “ risk-taking”, and had led to four new expositions: the argument from dominance, argument from expected utility, argument from dominating expected utility, and argument from strong dominance.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Pascal’s Wager
  • probability of God’s existence
  • Theism
  • rationality of religious belief
  • decision-making theory
  • expected utility
 

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