زمینه گرایی معرفتی و سمانتیک جملات معرفتی

نویسنده

مربی دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی واحد علوم و تحقیقات، تهران، ایران

چکیده

زمینه­گرایی معرفتی دیدگاهی جدید در معرفت­شناسی است که انگیزة ظهور آن، تلاش برای حل مسئلة شک­گرایی بوده است. این دیدگاه، اگر چه در حوزة معرفت­شناسی ظهور کرده و ادعای حلّ یکی از قدیمی­ترین مسائل آن را دارد، در واقع آموزه­ای سمانتیکی است. زمینه­گرایی معرفتی دیدگاهی دربارة شروط صدق جملات معرفتی است؛ جملاتی مانند "S می­داند کهP" و "S نمی­داند که P". این دیدگاه، به نوعی چرخش زبانی در معرفت­شناسی است. زمینه­گرا قصد دارد با استفاده از معنا و سمانتیک جملات معرفتی، مسائل معرفت­شناسی را حلّ کند. در این مقاله، یکی از مبانی سمانتیکی زمینه­گرایی - یعنی استاندارد معرفتی به ­عنوان مولفة بیان نشده- را بررسی خواهیم کرد و نشان خواهیم داد که ادعای سمانتیکی آن­ها، در بهترین حالت محل مناقشه خواهد بود.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Epistemic Contextualism and Semantics of knowledge attributions

نویسنده [English]

  • Ahmad Reza Hemmati Moghaddam
Instructor of Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

Epistemic Contextualism is a recent view in epistemology that has evolved primarily as a response to skepticism. Epistemic Contextualism is a semantic thesis and is the view that the truth conditions for knowledge attributions, sentences of the form “S knows that P” and “S doesn’t know that P”, can vary across contexts as a result of shifting epistemic standards. This view, in fact, is a linguistic turn in epistemology. Contextualist seeks to explained epistemological problems by semantics of knowledge sentences. In this paper I will examine one of the semantics foundations of Contextualism, that is epistemic standard as a unarticulated constituent, and will show that their epistemic claim is controversial and unpleasant.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Epistemic Contextualism
  • Semantics of knowledge Attributions
  • Unarticulated constituents
  • Knowledge
  • Truth conditions
  • Speaker meanings
  • Assertion
  • Implicature
  • semantics
  • Gradable adjectives
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